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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Utility seems to be to economists what the Lord is to theologians. Econo- 
mists talk about utility all the time, but do not seem to have hope of 
ever observing it this side of heaven. In micro-economic theory, almost 
any model is built on utility functions of  some kind. In empirical work 
little attempt is made to measure this all-pervasive concept. The concept 
is considered to be so esoteric as to defy direct measurement by mortals. 
Still, in a different role, viz. of non-economists, the same mortals are the 
sole possessors of  utility functions and they are able to do incredible 
things with it. 
For example :  Individuals knowing in advance what the price of sirloin 
steak will be on August  12, 1991 use their utility function to weigh the 
attractiveness of this steak against alternatives, taking into account how 
their  choice affects dinner possibilities at other  dates.  Not only that; 
since the amount of time spent on dinner affects the amount of time 
available for the accumulation of  human  capital,  they  also take into 
account how their choices affect their chances in the labor market ten 
years later, say. Those same individuals  are not able, however, to say 
whether a change from one to two bottles of beer yields a bigger increase 
in utility than a move from two bottles to three. This possibility is ruled 
out, because it would imply cardinality which is considered blasphemous 
in most economic denominations. 
As a result, there is a giant gap between theory and empirical work. 
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By  declaring it virtually impossible to measure utility  (except in an in- 
direct way, again like theologians who are able to quote various pieces 
of indirect evidence for the existence of God), economists have made it 
very hard  to test many of the assumptions made in theoretical models 
regarding the rationality of  economic agents. As a result,  theories have 
developed largely unchecked  by  empirical tests, to a point where non- 
economists would  probably  consider  them  utterly  unrealistic.  The de- 
fense that the theories at least approximate reality in some sense is hard 
to test, once again due to the self imposed restraint on the measurement 
of utility. 
On the other side of the coin, welfare economists have developed a 
sophisticated theoretical framework, which can be used as a foundation 
on which to build a rational socio-economic policy. The theoretical frame- 
work, however, relies heavily on utility functions. If these were deemed 
to be  observable, welfare  economics would  probably be of  enormous 
practical value to policy. As things stand economists’ agnostic attitude 
towards  utility  leads to tenuous  relations  between  theory  and applied 
work,  which  clouds  the  practical  politician’s  view  on  the  theoretical 
framework involved. 
In this paper we advocate the use of direct utility measures in socio- 
economic policy. We do this by  quoting a number of examples. Using 
directly measured individual welfare functions we  show how a number 
of  theoretical  notions  in  welfare  economics  can  be  operationalized 
straight-  forwardly. 
The first example concerns measurement of the cost of living. Obvi- 
ously an important practical issue, with an exact definition in economic 
theory. Today’s operationalizations  are all approximations to the exact 
definition. The use of directly measured welfare functions will be seen to 
lead to substantial simplifications and to be less vulnerable to model mis- 
specification. 
The second example deals with the evaluation of public goods. Quoting 
research by DAGENAIS  [1977], we show how monetary measures of the 
value of public goods can be obtained by means of survey questions. 
The third example deals with judgements about income distribution 
if some standard (and unrealistic) assumptions regarding utility functions 
are relaxed. In this context we  also pay attention to the definition of a 
poverty line. 
We end with some concluding remarks. 
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11.  COST OF LIVING INDICES 
The economic theory of cost of living indices can be paraphrased as fol- 
lows. Consider a household  described by  a vector of characteristics h. 
The vector h tells us what the age-composition of the household is, its 
place of residence, maybe the education of the household members, etc. 
The household has a utility function u describing its preferences regarding 
various commodities. The utility function depends on the characteristics 
vector  h.  The consumption behavior  of  the household  is  assumed  to 
follow from the maximization of its utility function, subject to a budget 
constraint. That is, it consumes a vector q of commodities such that the 
utility  function u(q; h) is maximized subject to p’q = y,  where p  is a 
vector of prices and y is income1. 
The solution of the maximization problem leads to a set of demand 
functions of the form: 
(2.1)  q = q(p, Y.  h) 
Under certain conditions, the parameters of the utility function u can be 
derived from the estimated parameters of the demand equations. Dual to 
the utility  function is the cost-function  c(u, p, h),  which gives  us  the 
amount of money needed to reach utility level u, given prices p and house- 
hold characteristics h. 
A cost of living index is a relative concept. It compares different situ- 
ations. Consider a family with  utility  u1,  facing prices pl and having 
characteristics hl. We call this the standard family. Then the true constant 
utility-cost of living index of a second family, with characteristics h2  and 
facing prices pz, relative to the standard family is defined as 
That is, the true cost of living index represents the amount of money the 
second family needs in order to be as well off  as the standard family. 
In the way the problem is presented here, interpersonal utility com- 
parisons are involved. If the second family were actually the standard 
family, but at a different date facing different prices, then no interper- 
sonal comparisons are involved. 
1. Whenever we speak of ‘income’ in this paper, we mean ‘after tax family income’. 
25 1 TOM  WANSBEEK  AND ARIE  KAPTEYN 
The index (2.2) can serve to compare differences in cost of living as- 
sociated with price differences, i.e.  for the construction of a price index, 
but also with differences in the elements of h. In so far as the standard 
family and the second family face the same prices and are also otherwise 
identical except for family composition, (2.2) represents a famiry income 
equivalence scale. 
The empirical implementation  of  (2.2) involves  a  number  of well- 
known problems. For price indices the common procedure is to approxi- 
mate the cost function, resulting in PAASCHE, LASPEYRES,  DIVISIA  indices, 
etc. The application of these indices requires the assumption that utility 
functions are constant over time. For family equivalence scales approxi- 
mations have been  based  on nutritional needs, food income ratios and 
expert judgements. In recent years, attempts have been made to imple- 
ment (2.2) as fully as possible [see e.g. MUELLBAUER  19801. The typical 
procedure is as follows. 
A convenient functional specification is chosen for the utility function 
and demand functions are derived. The demand functions are next esti- 
mated on the basis of cross-sectional data on household consumption. 
Since the unknown parameters of the utility function also appear in the 
demand system, the parameters of the utility function are estimated via 
the demand system2. In other words, by this procedure utility functions 
are measured indirectly. Once the utility function has been estimated, the 
cost function is known and (2.2) can be used to calculate a family equi- 
valence scale. 
It is worthwhile  to have a closer look at some aspects of this proce- 
dure. There is not much theoretical guidance as to the specification of the 
utility function and convenience is an important consideration. The deri- 
vation  of  the demand functions is based  on the assumption of utility 
maximization. This is a strong assumption  for which there exists very 
little empirical evidence. The data requirements are massive, because for 
each household in the sample one needs a complete picture of their con- 
sumption during a certain period. The whole analysis takes place within 
a static framework, ignoring habit formation aspects. Furthermore, util- 
ity functions are assumed independent in that one household’s  prefer- 
ences  are not  allowed  to  be  influenced  by  another  household’s  con- 
sumption. 
because an identification problem arises [see, e.g., MUELLBAUER  19751. 
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Some of these assumptions are obviously unrealistic, each of them 
possibly causing a serious specification error. It is, moreover, hard  to 
test the assumptions because they are so entangled. For instance, if one 
tests for SLUTSKY  symmetry, a rejection may indicate that households do 
not maximize utility, but it may also mean that the utility function was 
misspecified or that habit formation was wrongly neglected. Since, fur- 
thermore,  the massive data requirements introduce various possibilities 
of measurement error and in addition there is an identification problem, 
the results of the indirect approach should be viewed with sound suspicion. 
Still, the modern approach to family equivalence scales is probably 
the area of  applied welfare economics where the connection  between 
theory  and empirical  work  is closest. The practical  complications are 
mostly due to the insistence on indirect utility measurement. With direct 
utility measures, models become a lot simpler, as we shall see presently: 
We restrict the discussion of the employment of direct utility measures 
in  the construction of equivalence scales mainly  to individual  welfare 
functions of income (WFI’s), although most of the features also apply 
to other measures. We assume the WFI concept to be known [see, e.g., 
VAN  PRAAG  and KAPTEYN  19731. 
How then can WFI’s be used to construct equivalence scales? It has 
been found by VAN  PRAAG  (1971), VAN  PRAAG  and KAPTEYN  (1973), VAN 
HERWAARDEN,  KAPTEYN  and VAN  PRAAG  (1977) that the WFI-parameter 
p varies systematically over respondents according to their income and 
the size of their family. The following regression equation represents this 
relationship (for convenience of notation, indices referring to the unit of 
observation are suppressed) : 
p = po + pl lnfs + p2 Iny + v  (2.3) 
where fs is the size of  the family, measured (for the time being) by the 
number of family members: y is after tax family income; v is a random 
disturbance term with zero expectation, distributed identically for each 
family; and PO, PI, PZ  are parameters.  The R2-values for (2.3) typically 
are about 0.50.  It has also been found that CJ  does not correlate signifi- 
cantly with lnfs and Iny, hence c  is treated as exogenous. 
Inserting (2.3) in the formula for the lognormal distribution function, 
ignoring the random disturbance term v, one sees that an individual with 
family size fs and income y evaluates the income y by 
U(y) =  N[lny -  p; 0,oJ =  N[-  Po -  PI lnfs + (1 -  p2) Iny; 0, u]  (2.4) 
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The individual’s evaluation of family income thus depends on both in- 
come and family size: 
u = U(y, fs)  (2.5) 
Notice that prices play no role here, because (2.3) stems from a cross- 
section, which allows us to assume that all individuals face by and large 
the same prices. 
Invoking the definition of the cost of living index and taking the WFI 
as a measure of  utility, we see that, relative to a standard family with 
income level yl and family size fsl, the cost of living of another family 
of size fs2 is given by yzlyl, where y2  is the solution of 
U(Y1, fSl) = U(Y2. fs2)  (2.6) 
where U is given in (2.4). Writing this out, we obtain: 
N[-  PO -  pl lnfsz + (1 -  p2) Inyz; 0, (~zl  = NI-  PO -  PI) lnfsl +  (2.7) 
+ (1 -  P2) Inyl; 0,011 
Since cr  is taken exogenous (not depending on income or family size) we 
may as well ignore variation in  cr  and fix c at its population average (it 
will turn out that the resulting index is not dependent upon the particular 
value of B chosen). Switching from welfare space to income space, (2.7) 
carries over into 
-  PO -  p1 lnfsz + (1 -  p2) lnyz = -  PO -  Pi lnfsl + (1 -  p2) lnyl  (2.8) 
because N is a monotonically increasing function. Hence, 
(2.9) 
The ratio y2/y1 is the equivalence scale value (the value of the cost of 
living index) of family 2 relative to the standard family 1. 
Just as (2.2) represents the ratio of money amounts needed by fami- 
lies 2 and 1 to be at the same utility level, y2/y1 represents the ratio of 
income levels needed by  both families to be at the same utility level, the 
only difference being the kind of utility measure used. Note that, although 
both (2.2) and (2.6) indicate a dependence of the equivalence scale on 
the utility level which one wants to hold constant, the special form of 
the utility function (2.4) leads to an equivalence scale (2.9), which is in- 
dependent of the utility level. Also, the equivalence scale does not de- 
pend on b. 
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From the viewpoint of economic theory one has to ask the question 
whether it is legitimate to use WFI’s as measures of  utility. No definite 
answer  appears to be  possible to this question:  A  utility function is 
essentially a primitive concept, partly defined by  its mode of  measure- 
ment. In economic theory, utility functions are both used as concepts 
that have to explain behavior and as measures of  well-being in welfare 
economics. MUELLBAUER’S  analysis [MUELLBAUER  1974, 1977, 19801 pro- 
vides an example of both uses in one and the same analysis. In view  of 
its mode of measurement (through questions that ask directly for evalu- 
ations), the WFI has to be primarily viewed as a measure of well-being. 
It turns out, however, that the individual welfare function concept can 
also be used to explain behavior [KAPTEYN, WANSBEEK  and BUYZE  19791, 
which lends it a character similar to the classical utility concept3. 
In any case, the reasoning that leads to the construction of a true cost 
of living index mainly rests upon the fact that a utility function is con- 
sidered as a measure of well-being. 
Hitherto, fs has been defined as the number of family members. Obvi- 
ously this is somewhat primitive. KAPTEYN  and VAN  PRAAG  [1976, 19801 
have therefore refined the definition of fs to 
n 
i=l 
fs = C a(i) f(ai)  (2.10) 
where n is the number of family members, a(i) is the rank weight attached 
to the i-th family member (the rank order is: woman, man, oldest child, 
oldest child but one, etc.), f(ai) is the agefunction representing the weight 
given to a family member of age ai. 
The precise specification of a(i) and f(ai) need not concern us here. 
Given a parametric specification of both functions, their parameters can 
be estimated along with Po,  PI,  P2 by  matching (2.3) with cross-section 
data. Results obtained hitherto by KAPTEYN  and VAN  PRAAG  [1976,1980] 
3. In fact, if one interprets the survey questions that underlie the direct measure- 
ment of p and a  as asking for minimum amounts needed to feel ‘delighted’, ‘pleased’ 
etc. then a WFI would be an indirect utility function and its dual an expenditure func- 
tion, measuring how much it  takes to reach a certain utility level. Also KAPTEYN, 
WANSBEEK  and BUYZE  [1979, Section 2.11 argue that at least near to an individual’s 
own income level the WFI will be a close approximation to his or her indirect utility 
function. It should be mentioned, though, that VAN  PRAAG’S  derivation [VAN PRAAG 
19681 is not based on an explicit utility maximization problem. 
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show a reasonable agreement (but also some differences) with the results 
obtained through various other methods. 
Comparing the direct method with the indirect method, it is obvious 
that the data requirements for the direct method are considerably less. 
Rather than an extensive list of consumption items per household, one 
only needs the WFI of one of the household members (preferably the 
household  head).  Also  the  possibilities  for  misspecification  are more 
limited. The lognormal form of the WFI can be tested (VAN  HERWAARDEN 
and KAPTEYN  [1981], ANTONIDES,  KAPTEYN  and WANSBEEK  [1980]). As to 
habit formation and preference interdependence, which are both ignored 
in  the indirect approach: these are obviously also ignored in (2.3). Be- 
cause (2.3) is very simple to begin with, it is certainly easier to incorporate 
these effects in the direct approach than in the indirect approach. More- 
over, there exists a preference formation theory which specifies how (2.3) 
has to be extended to incorporate preference interdependence and habit 
formation  (KAPTEYN  [1977,  19791,  KAPTEYN  and WANSBEEK  [1982]).  In 
KAPTEYN  [  1977, Sec. 8.21 family equivalence scales were estimated while 
accounting for preference interdependence. Due to severe multicollinear- 
ity it is hard to draw hard conclusions from his results, but it appears 
that the allowance for preference interdependence definitely affects the 
equivalence scales obtained. 
WFI’s  are not the only direct utility  measures  that can be used to 
construct equivalence scales. DUBNOFF,  VAUGHAN  and LANCASTER  [  19811 
use respondents’ self-evaluations of  their standard of living. Regressing 
this measure on income and family composition yields significant results. 
Family equivalence scales are next found by varying income with family 
composition in such a way  that the predicted self evaluation remains 
constant. This yields directly measured equivalence scales. Since (2.4) also 
expresses utility  as a function of income and family size the difference 
between their approach and the approach described  above is basically 
one of functional form. In principle, the choice of functional form can 
be decided upon by statistical analysis. 
The discussion in this section has concentrated on family equivalence 
scales, but a similar analysis is possible regarding other elements of the 
vector  of characteristics h. DUBNOFF,  VAUCHAN  and LANCASTER  [I9811 
also include regions in their regression. This immediately leads to cost 
of living indices for different regions. The same analysis could be per- 
formed with WFI’s. 
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111.  THE EVALUATION OF  PUBLIC  GOODS 
The theory of public goods provides a prime example of an area where 
utility functions play a predominant role in developing the theory, but 
virtually no role in applied work. For instance, since SAMUELSON’S  elegant 
analysis [1954, 19551 we know that individual demand functions for public 
goods should be added vertically rather than horizontally.  But how we 
can actually measure a demand function for public goods has never be- 
come clear. In this section we give two examples of how directly measured 
welfare functions can be used to arrive at monetary measures of the value 
of public goods. 
The first example derives from AARON  and MCGUIRE’S  classic article 
[1970]. They consider the problem of how to impute the value of public 
goods to households. In view of the high level of provision with public 
goods in developed countries, this problem is of obvious importance for 
a good understanding of the redistributional role played by governments. 
AARON  and MCGUIRE  note that the crucial variable in the solution of 
such a problem is the marginal rate of substitution between the public 
goods and private income. In some empirical exercises they assume how 
the marginal rate of  substitution between public goods and private in- 
come varies with income. On the basis of  that assumption they impute 
the value of public goods to income brackets. 
Later authors have tried to circumvent the problem of measurement 
of the demand for public goods by devising intricate mechanisms for the 
revelation of preferences for public goods (e.g.,  CLARKE  [1971], GROVES 
and LEDYARD  [  1977,19801, GREEN  and LAFFONT  [  1977]), so that economic 
agents are induced to show behavior which brings about an efficient equi- 
librium. Although it is nice to see that such mechanisms exist, they appear 
to be too complicated to be of practical value. 
Employing WFI’s, one can think of simpler methods. A good example 
is the study by DAGENAIS  [1977]. The public good considered is air quality. 
She asks a sample of about 80 people to rate combinations of income and 
air quality. The air quality is measured by an index ranging from zero 
to one hundred. For each of ten different verbal labels, from ‘excellent’ 
to ‘very bad’, respondents are asked to specify combinations of air quality 
and income corresponding to those labels. The labels are taken to repre- 
sent points on a  [O,  I]-welfare scale in exactly the same way  as verbal 
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labels are used to measure WFI’s. The income, air quality combinations 
represent points  of indifference curves corresponding  to the points  on 
the welfare scale. Grouping the sample in three subsamples according to 
income,  she estimates a  bivariate  welfare function  of income and air 
quality for each of the three  groups. Three functional forms are con- 
sidered : the bivariate normal, the bivariate lognormal and a quadratic 
function.  After  some  experimenting  she  chooses  the  bivariate  log- 
normal. 
Given the estimates, the marginal rate of substitution between income 
and the public good air quality is  known for each of the three income 
groups. So, for example, if the government might decide to start a pol- 
lution abatement project to be financed by a tax increase, then the distri- 
butional effects are known; on the tax side, because tax rates are of course 
known,  and on  the  benefit side,  because one can calculate the dollar 
value of a certain improvement in air quality for each of the groups. 
Obviously, DAGENAIS’  procedure may be refined, but that is not the 
main point. Her procedure appears to be simple and workable. The pro- 
cedure can also be applied to other public goods, like public transpor- 
tation or crime prevention. 
A common objection to direct questioning methods is the possibility 
of free rider behavior. If respondents to DAGENAIS’  questionnaire realize 
that their answers may be used to tax them to finance a pollution abate- 
ment project, they may understate the true value of air quality to them. 
How serious such a problem  is remains to be  seen. At the very least, 
effective free ridership requires a high level of sophistication on the part 
of  the respondents  and the availability of a substantial amount of in- 
formation on the preferences of others. To avoid the free rider problem 
one can conceive of slightly less direct methods using WFI’s. Let there 
be a public good whose provision varies regionally (as may well be the 
case in the U.S. for instance). By measuring WFI’s in the different regions 
and controlling for factors like family composition, income, regional price 
differences etc., a systematic comparison of WFI’s across regions provides 
‘equivalence scales’ for public goods exactly analogous to the construc- 
tion of equivalence scales for differences in family composition considered 
in the previous section. 
A second example is cost-benefit analysis. The argument is again due 
to DAGENAIS  [1977]. Let there be a social welfare function (SWF) of the 
form : 
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w=  W(U1, ...,  UN)  (3.1) 
where U,  (n = 1,  .  .  . ,  N) is the utility function of the n-th individual (or 
family) : 
Un = Un(xn, Zn),  n  1, ...,  N  (3.2) 
with  xn and Zn  amounts of private goods x and z consumed  by  indi- 
vidual n. A project is considered which will affect the relative prices of 
x and z.  For a small change in relative prices, the project will improve 
social welfare if 
Equation (3.3) can be rewritten as 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
where (aUn/&n)/(&Jn/axn)  is the marginal rate of  substitution  between 
commodities z and x for individual n. If all individuals maximize util- 
ity, then 
I  aUn 
pX  axn -  An 
with A,  being the marginal utility of money for individual n, and px the 
price of x. Under utility maximization we also have that 
aUn  ,/z  = PzlPx 
with pz being the price of z. So criterion (3.4) is equivalent to 
(3.5) 
The term in square brackets is the monetary gain (or loss) of the n-th 
individual due to the project. 
In customary cost-benefit analysis, net benefits are defined as the sum 
of all monetary gains and benefits, i.e. by  setting aW/XJn = l/L. In a 
sense, aW/aUn is the weight given to the n-th individual in the SWF. 
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Clearly,  then,  cost-benefit  analysis  implicitly  assigns  weights  to indi- 
viduals  (or families) inversely proportional  to their  utility  of income. 
Since the marginal utility of income tends to fall with rising income, cost- 
benefit analysis gives a higher weight to well-to-do  people  than to the 
less well-to-do. 
There have been attempts to redress the situation by applying distri- 
butional  weights, for instance by  weighing benefits to different groups 
differently. Although in principle correct, without knowledge of the mar- 
ginal utility of money and an explicitly specified SWF, the ad hoc intro- 
duction of weights is arbitrary. Of course, the marginal utility of money 
is  directly  measured  by  WFI’s,  so that their  relevance  to cost-benefit 
analysis is clear. 
Finally, returning to the pollution abatement example discussed above, 
let z be the public good air quality and let Xn be individual n’s  income. 
Call individual n’s  marginal rate of substitution between 
Then (3.4) becomes 
z and Xn, mn. 
(3.6) 
Since for public goods there are no market prices which can be used to 
measure mn, one sees that cost-benefit analysis of  a project involving a 
public good can only be carried out if a measure of mn can be obtained, 
as in DAGENAIS’  procedure. 
IV.  SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS  AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
The example regarding the implicit social welfare weights used in cost- 
benefit analysis illustrates that attempts to avoid utility measurement in 
policy oriented research easily lead to practices that involve implicit inter- 
personal  utility  comparisons  of  an undesirable  nature.  One  may,  of 
course, be willing to explicitly specify a SWF, but insist on measuring 
utility indirectly. That, again, leads to complicated models and involves 
many entangled assumptions as in  the indirect measurement of  family 
equivalence scales. 
In recent years, quite a literature has developed  that uses an SWF 
framework to derive optimal taxation rules. As usual in theory, authors 
try to make as weak assumptions as possible and still arrive at policy 
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conclusions of some practical value. Despite the attempts to make weak 
assumptions, some of them are unacceptable, primarily the supposition 
that utility functions are constant and independent of one another. This 
assumption is at variance with reality and has a dramatic influence on 
the conclusion of these studies. LAYARD  [1980] shows that alternative as- 
sumptions lead to entirely different conclusions. For instance, in a simple 
model with an additive SWF, where utility depends on the number  of 
hours worked and one’s ranking in the income distribution, the optimal 
marginal tax rate turns out to be unity! 
Given the fact that assumptions on utility functions have such a dra- 
matic effect on the conclusions of theoretical studies, empirical investi- 
gations into the validity of those assumptions should be of considerable 
scientific interest.  Research with respect to WFI’s has time and again 
brought out that WFI’s are interdependent (i. e. one person’s WFI is in- 
fluenced by other person’s behavior; see, e.g., KAPTEYN,  VAN  PRAAG  and 
VAN  HERWAARDEN  [1976, 19781, KAPTEYN,  WANSBEEK  and BUYZE  [1978, 
19801) and subject to habit formation (KAPTEYN,  WANSBEEK  and BUYZE 
[1980], KAPTEYN  and WANSBEEK  [1982]). 
Even with the simplifying assumption  of constant and independent 
preferences, models in optimal taxation  theory tends to become fairly 
complicated (see, e.g., MIRRLEES  [1971], SHESHINSKI  [1972], to mention a 
few classics, or the review paper by BRADFORD  and ROSEN  [1976]), whereas 
the results are not very specific. Introducing habit formation and prefer- 
ence interdependence undoubtedly would further complicate the models. 
Rather than attempting to further generalize existing models it is worth- 
while to carry out specific research on the building blocks of such models. 
A few examples may clarify this. 
KAPTEYN  and  VAN HERWAARDEN  El9801  use  a model  developed in 
KAPTEYN,  VAN  PRAAG  and VAN  HERWAARDEN  [1976, 19781, in which the 
interdependence  of WFI’s has been  quantified  on the basis  of a  1971 
sample of about 3,000 families in the Netherlands.  Using a SWF which 
is additive in WFI’s, and neglecting feed back effects from income re- 
distribution  to the level of  national income, they compute the income 
distribution which maximizes the SWF. One of the outcomes is that the 
usual postulate in inequality measurement, that strict equality of incomes 
is optimal, does no longer hold true. Although the computation of  the 
optimal income distribution is a non-trivial task, the model is conceptu- 
ally straightforward. One simply blends theoretical insights from welfare 
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economics with a quantitative model. Although, partly due to data limi- 
tations, the quantitative model should be viewed as preliminary, the exer- 
cise shows clearly how progress can be made by empirical analysis. 
A second example is due to KAPTEYN  [1977]. Employing a preference 
formation theory  which has been  tested  fairly extensively, he analyzes 
the effects of economic growth and income redistribution  on the distri- 
bution  of welfare (i.e. the evaluation  of incomes). In the simplest case 
where incomes are equal and grow at a constant rate, the growth rate 
turns out to be irrelevant to individual welfare, provided it is positive. 
In more complicated situations the results are less clear-cut, but always 
very specific. That is, if the relevant parameters are known (and they can 
be estimated if sufficient data are collected), then the results of various 
income policies can be compared unambiguously. 
The thlrd, and final, example of this section deals with the definition 
of a poverty line. The usual role of a poverty line is to provide a lower 
cut-off point for the income distribution. Although economists have de- 
veloped  various  measurements to describe the extent  of  poverty  in  a 
society given the level of the poverty  line (e.g.,  SEN  f19761, KAKWANI 
[1980]), they have been silent on the question of  how a poverty line has 
to be defined. Various ad hoc approaches have been applied in practice, 
but none of these has any reasonable theoretical basis. 
In GOEDHART  et al.  [1977],  a  new  approach to the definition  of  a 
poverty line is developed which is related  to the WFI-framework.  In a 
survey of  1748 Dutchmen in 1975, they ask the question: 
'We would like to know  which net family income would in your circumstances be 
the absolute minimum for you. That is to say, that you would not be able to make 
ends meet if you earned less.' 
We call a respondent's answer to this question the respondent's  mini- 
mum income, ymh. If we plot the logarithm of ymin against the logarithm 
of actual income, y, for a given family size, we get the line AB in Figure I. 
GOEDHART  et al. [I9771 argue that yiin,  corresponding to the intersection 
of the 45O-line and AB, is an estimate of the true poverty line in society. 
Their argument runs as follows: 
Consider an individual with income y(l). His minimum will be y:in. 
Suppose he evaluates y(1) by 0.8 and yi:,,  by  0.45. Now let his income 
fall from y(1) to y:!,,.  Immediately, his new income ycin will be considered 
to be absolutely minimal. However, as time passes he will become accus- 
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tomed to the new situation and he will realize that he is actually in situ- 
ation ~(21,  which is quite tolerable. He then will evaluate yt2)  by 0.6, for 
instance, and according to Figure 1 he will begin to consider ygh to be 
the absolute minimum for him. If his income would fall from y(2)  to ygin, 
an adaptation process would start, similar to the adaptation process that 
took place when his income fell from y(l)  to ygjn, etc. The process stops 
when y = yLin, 
Apparently, a respondent’s perception of the poverty line is distorted 
by  the fact that his actual income is not equal to his minimum income 
level. There is only one income level, yTnin, where this misperception does 
not obtain. Therefore,  is taken as the definition of the poverty line. 
VAN  PRAAG,  GOEDHART  and KAPTEYN  [1980] have given an alternative 
motivation, which does not depend on the above dynamic interpretation : 
Ideally, a poverty line satisfies the requirement that somebody with 
an income above it feels able to make ends meet, whereas somebody 
below it does not. According to Figure 1, everybody above yLin has an 
income y>ymin and hence these people feel that they can make ends 
meet. Any person below y&, has an income y <  ymin and therefore feels 
that he cannot make ends meet. Thus yLin satisfies the requirement. It 
is, moreover, obvious that y:h  is the only income level satisfying the 
requirement for being a poverty line. 
The relation between ymin and y has been given for one family size. 
If one repeats the drawing for different family sizes, it turns out that the 
line AB shifts parallel upward if family size increases. In fact lines like 
AB are generated by the regression equation : 
Inyh  = a0 + a1 lnfs + a2 lny + w  (4.1) 
where fs is again the family size. The intersection point for a given family 
size fso is found by equating Ymin to y (ignoring w): 
lny&i,  = (UO  + a1 lnfso)/(l -  UZ)  (4.2) 
Model (4.1) can be complicated along the lines of the preference for- 
mation theory, so that the poverty line is differentiated with respect to 
more characteristics than family size, but that need not concern us here. 
The approach has two aspects which tie it to the individual welfare 
function. The first is its directness, similar to the direct measurement of 
family equivalence scales; no observations on economic behavior  are 
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Figure  I 
The Relationship Between Log-Minimum Income 
and Log-Income for a Given Family Size 
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used, the estimation of equation (4.1)  requires minimal information per 
respondent. At the same time the heavy reliance on one question, which 
yields ymin per respondent, makes it particularly important that the ques- 
tion probes for the correct minimum income concept. For example, some 
respondents may provide a short run minimum (e.g.,  ignoring the neces- 
sity of replacing durables after some time) whereas others may provide 
a long run minimum which would be sufficient during a longer period. 
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Hitherto these aspects have not been studied in depth. The results ob- 
tained up till now have therefore to be viewed primarily as illustrative. 
The second link with WFI’s is provided by  the fact that in various 
surveys WFI’s have been measured for the same respondents who gave 
their minimum income. One can therefore compute the evaluation of ymin 
per respondent and one can estimate the evaluation of yiin  by somebody 
whose actual income would be equal to yiin.  GOEDHART  et al. find the 
latter evaluation to be about 0.35. In a later study for ten European coun- 
tries, VAN  PRAAG,  GOEDHART  and KAPTEYN  [1979, 19801 find evaluations 
ranging from 0.36 in The Netherlands to 0.53 in Italy, for a one person 
family. The evaluation of yiin  appears to vary slightly with family size. 
The use of WFI’s to find the welfare level associated with the poverty 
line generates an interesting alternative definition. The evaluations of yLin 
quoted were fairly low. Politicians may feel that they are too low and 
decide for instance that nobody in society should experience a welfare 
level below 0.45, say. Using the WFI, and the relation between the para- 
meters of an individual’s WFI and his income and family size, makes it 
possible to compute a poverty line which guarantees that everyone is at 
0.45, say, or higher. Such computations have been carried out by GOED- 
HART et al. [1977] and VAN PRAAG,  GOEDHART  and KAPTEYN  [1980]. 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Ultimately, socio-economic policy deals with human welfare. This is rec- 
ognized in theoretical welfare economics where utility functions play a 
fundamental role.  With a few, rather  arbitrarily chosen, examples we 
have tried to show how theoretical welfare economics and direct utility 
measures can be blended into a useful tool of policy analysis. 
Somewhere along the line economists have come to believe that their 
discipline should only deal with ‘objective’, ‘hard’ measures like income 
or output. TKese hard measures often appear to be misleading indicators 
of well-being (like per capita national income which appears not to have 
any relation with citizens’ self-reported happiness, CJ EASTERLIN  [1974]). 
Consequently, one may doubt whether economic policy has served people 
as well as it could have. The hard measures appear not to be so objective 
after  all and soft methods, like using survey questions,  provide infor- 
mation with a closer relation to economic theory. 
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SUMMARY 
Utility functions play a central role in welfare economics. At a theoretical level the 
same is true in the analysis of public policy problems. Examples are: the construction 
of true cost of living indices, cost benefit analysis, optimal taxation. Since economists 
typically measure utility indirectly, or not at all, the applied work in public policy 
analysis uses ‘hard’ measures, like income or consumption. Consequently, the relation 
between application and theory often becomes tenuous. In the paper it is shown how 
direct measures of utility obtained from survey questions can be  used to tackle policy 
issues in a way that does more justice to economic theory. In the cases where this 
‘soft’ approach has been used, the results appear to be quite sensible. The data require- 
ments are usually substantially less than with the traditional methods. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Nutzenfunktionen spielen in der Wohlfahrtsokonomik eine zentrale Rolle. Theoretisch 
gesehen gilt das auch fur die Analyse der Programme staatlicher Politik, etwa bei der 
Konstruktion  eines ((wahren)) Lebenshaltungskostenindex,  bei  der  Kosten-Nutzen- 
Analyse, bei der Frage der optimalen Besteuerung. Weil man in der Okonomie den 
Nutzen typischerweise -  wenn uberhaupt -  indirekt misst, verwendet die Analyse der 
Programme staatlicher Politik  ((harte)) Messinstrumente, wie  Einkommen und Ver- 
brauch. Demzufolge wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Theorie und praktischer An- 
wendung oft fragwiirdig. Der Beitrag zeigt, wie direkte Nutzenmessungen, wie sie aus 
Befragungen gewonnen werden, bei der Programmbewertung in einer Weise verwendet 
werden konnen, die der okonomischen Theorie besser entspricht. Wo dieser <<weiche>) 
Ansatz verwendet worden ist, ergaben sich durchaus sinnvolle Resultate. Der hierfur 
erforderliche Datenbedarf ist in der Regel wesentlich geringer als bei den herkomm- 
lichen Methoden. 
Les fonctions d‘utilite jouent un rde  central dans I’bnomie du bienltre. Au niveau 
theorique  il en est de mCme  pour I’analyse des problemes de la politique publique. 
Par exemple: la construction des indices du coDt vrai de la vie, I’analyse des profits 
et charges, la taxation optimale. Comme, typiquement, les kconomistes mesurent I’uti- 
lit6 indirectement ou ne le  font pas du tout, les etudes appliqu&s  dans la politique 
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publique emploient des mesures (<dures)),  come  le revenu ou la consommation. Par 
consequent, la relation entre l'application et la theorie devient souvent minime. Dans 
cet article, on a montre comment des mesures directes de l'utilite  qui sont le resultat 
de diverses questions d'une enqutte peuvent 6tre employtks dans I'analyse des affaires 
publiques d'une  facon qui fait valoir la thkorie konomique. Dans les cas ou cette 
approche ctmollei) a ete utilisee, les resultats se trouvent Btre raisonnables. Les con- 
ditions requises des donnkes sont genkralement beaucoup moins strictes que dam le 
cas oa I'on opere selon les methodes traditionnelles. 
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